

**CILogon Silver Certification Authority
Certificate Policy
and
Certification Practice Statement
(CP/CPS)**

December 3, 2014

Version 11
1.3.6.1.4.1.34998.1.1.11

<http://ca.cilogon.org/policy/silver>

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

This document is a combined Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement for the CILogon Silver Certification Authority. It is structured according to [RFC 3647](#).

The CA issues end entity certificates to cyberinfrastructure users. Identification and authentication of certificate applicants is performed by US research and education institutions who are members of the [InCommon Federation](#) and qualify for the [InCommon Silver](#) identity assurance designation, which is consistent with the US government FICAM Trust Framework Provider Adoption Process (TFPAP) "Level 2" identity assurance.

Subscribers obtain a certificate from the CA according to the following process. First, the subscriber authenticates to his or her institution's identity provider, which issues a signed, time-limited SAML authentication assertion to the CA web service. Then, the CA web service validates the authentication assertion (consulting InCommon Federation metadata), and if valid, assigns an X.500 distinguished name to the subscriber based on the identifying information in the authentication assertion. Finally, the CA issues a signed X.509 certificate containing the subject distinguished name to the subscriber.

The CA is an InCommon service provider, because it accepts assertions from InCommon identity providers. It is registered with InCommon through the [University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign](#).

The CA is subject to accreditation by the [International Grid Trust Federation](#) (via [The Americas Grid Policy Management Authority](#)) under the Member Integrated Credential Services Authentication Profile, which applies to CAs that issue X.509 certificates to end entities based on an external primary source of identity (in this case, the identity provider or the subscriber's institution), with a maximum certificate validity period of 13 months. The CA acts as an independent trusted third party for both subscribers and relying parties within a defined user community (i.e., users of the US National Science Foundation cyberinfrastructure). The CA uses a long-term signing key, which is stored in a secure manner. The CA is an automated system that issues certificates based on pre-existing identity data maintained by members of the InCommon Federation.

1.2 Document name and identification

Name: CILogon Silver Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Practice Statement

Version: 11

Date: December 3, 2014

ASN.1 object identifier: iso.org.dod.internet.private.enterprise (1.3.6.1.4.1) [CILogon Project](#) (34998) Certificate Policies (1) CILogon Silver CA (1) Version (11)

Revision history:

1. Jan 15 2010: Initial version submitted to TAGPMA reviewers.
2. Apr 2 2010: Added definitions and acronyms ([Section 1.6](#)). Documented frequency of publication of CA certificates ([Section 2.3](#)). Documented acceptance of GivenName+Surname as a preferred alternative to DisplayName in determining subscriber's name ([Section 3.1.1](#)). Documented how the CA is informed of changes that may affect the status of the certificate ([Section 3.2.3](#)). Documented that identity providers must be certified by InCommon under the Silver Identity Assurance Profile (Sections [3.2.5](#), [4.1.1](#), [4.2.2](#)). Document process of rejecting requests ([Section 4.1.2](#)). Document CRL backup hosted by DOEGrids CA (Sections 4.20.1). Document training requirements for personnel (Section 5.3). Document that CA systems are on networks

actively monitored for intrusions (Section 6.7). Remove policy OID 1.2.840.113612.5.2.3.2.2 for face-to-face identity vetting from EECs (Sections 7.1.2, 7.1.6). Clarify reliance on InCommon for RA audits (Section 8.1). Acknowledge NSF financial support (Section 9.17).

3. Jul 28 2010: Updated location of self-signed CA certificates in Section 2.2 to use <https://cilogon.org>. Changed "certification status" to "valid certification status" in Sections 3.2.5 and 4.2.2. Added "and abide by" in Section 5.3.3. Changed "locked cabinet" to "safe" in Section 6.2.4. In Section 6.5.1, documented monitoring of network and CA systems.
4. Sep 13 2010: Added another circumstance for revocation in [Section 4.9.1](#): "The initial identity validation for obtaining the certificate is determined to not comply with [Section 3.2](#)."
5. Sep 28 2010: Modified to confirm to IGTF SLCS Profile rather than the MICS Profile. In particular, maximum certificate lifetime is reduced from 13 months to 11 days.
6. Oct 5 2010: After TAGPMA deliberation, returned to MICS Profile. Maximum certificate lifetime increased back to 13 months. Also replaced instances of "no stipulation" with "not applicable" where appropriate.
7. Oct 6 2010: Added notice in [Section 3.2.5](#) that the CA "may independently reject assertions from a particular identity provider, even if that identity provider is certified by InCommon."
8. Dec 14 2010: Add SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 in [Section 7.1.3](#) (algorithm object identifiers) to enable move to SHA-2 hash functions per the [NIST Policy on Hash Functions](#).
9. Jan 12 2011: Allow subscriber private keys to be generated by the CA and delivered securely to subscribers.
10. Feb 3 2011: Further clarify process for CA generation of subscriber private keys in [Section 4.1.2](#).
11. Dec 3 2014: Minor updates for InCommon Silver Identity Assurance Profile v1.1. Increase CRL validity period from two weeks to 30 days ([Section 2.3](#)). Added ORNL site information ([Section 5.1](#)).

1.3 PKI participants

1.3.1 Certification authorities

The CA issues end entity certificates. It does not issue certificates to any subordinate CAs.

1.3.2 Registration authorities

Identification and authentication of certificate applicants is performed by US research and education institutions who are members of the [InCommon Federation](#) and qualify for the [InCommon Silver](#) identity assurance designation, which is consistent with the US government FICAM Trust Framework Provider Adoption Process (TFPAP) "Level 2" identity assurance. The InCommon Silver identity assurance profile defines standards for identity vetting, system management and security, record-keeping, revocation, audits, and name management.

1.3.3 Subscribers

The subscribers of the CA are cyberinfrastructure users.

1.3.4 Relying parties

The relying parties of the CA are the cyberinfrastructure providers, the [International Grid Trust Federation](#) relying party members, and any other recipient of a certificate issued by the CA who acts in reliance on that certificate and/or any digital signatures verified using that certificate.

1.3.5 Other participants

No stipulation.

1.4 Certificate usage

1.4.1 Appropriate certificate uses

The CA issues certificates for use in authenticating to cyberinfrastructure.

1.4.2 Prohibited certificate uses

The CA makes no prohibitions on the use of the certificates it issues.

1.5 Policy administration

1.5.1 Organization administering the document

This policy is administered by the CILogon Policy Management Authority (pma@cilogon.org).

The CA is subject to accreditation by the [International Grid Trust Federation](#) (via [The Americas Grid Policy Management Authority](#)) under the Member Integrated Credential Services Authentication Profile. All policy changes are subject to IGTF/TAGPMA review and approval.

1.5.2 Contact person

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Urbana, Illinois 61801 USA
jbasney@cilogon.org
Voice: +1 217-244-1954
Fax: +1 217-244-1987

For inquiries and fault reporting, contact ca@cilogon.org.

1.5.3 Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

This combined CP/CPS is administered by the CILogon Policy Management Authority (pma@cilogon.org), which determines its suitability. All versions of this policy are submitted to the IGTF/TAGPMA for review and approval prior to operation.

1.5.4 CPS approval procedures

The CILogon Policy Management Authority approves CP/CPS changes by consensus of its members. [TAGPMA](#) CP/CPS approval procedures are specified in the [TAGPMA Charter](#).

1.6 Definitions and acronyms

This document uses terms as defined in Section 2 of [RFC 3647](#).

The InCommon Identity Assurance Framework and Silver Identity Assurance Profile are specified in documents at <http://www.incommonfederation.org/assurance>.

[NIST SP 800-63](#) defines four levels of authentication, with Level 1 providing the lowest assurance and Level 4 providing the highest. This document targets Level 2, which provides "single factor remote network authentication" and requires "presentation of identifying materials or information". Level 2 allows authentication tokens as well as passwords and PINs. Eavesdropper, replay, and on-line guessing attacks are prevented. The US government FICAM Trust Framework Provider Adoption Process ([TFPAP](#)) defines an assessment process for these levels of authentication.

2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 Repositories

The CA publishes information regarding its practices, certificates, contact information, etc., at <http://ca.cilogon.org/>.

The root CA certificate is delivered to relying parties according to [Section 6.1.4](#).

2.2 Publication of certification information

The CA publishes certification information at the following locations:

http://ca.cilogon.org/	web page of the CA for general information
http://ca.cilogon.org/cilogon-silver-policy.pdf	the current version of this policy
https://cilogon.org/cilogon-silver.pem	self-signed PEM-formatted CA certificate
https://cilogon.org/cilogon-silver.crt	self-signed DER-formatted CA certificate
http://crl.cilogon.org/cilogon-silver.r0	PEM-formatted CRL
http://crl.cilogon.org/cilogon-silver.crl	DER-formatted CRL

The CA web page contains (in addition to the above):

- all versions of this CP/CPS document under which valid certificates have been issued
- an official contact email address (ca@cilogon.org) for inquiries and fault reporting
- a postal contact address

2.3 Time or frequency of publication

CRLs will be published immediately after a certificate has been revoked as well as on a daily basis. Each CRL's This Update field will indicate the issue date of the CRL, and the Next Update field will be set to 30 days in the future, to indicate a 30 day validity period for the CRL.

CA certificates will be published on the CA web page and also submitted to external distributions/repositories (see [Section 6.1.4](#)) in advance of their use in operation. Under normal circumstances, the CA will not begin operation with a new CA certificate until that certificate has been distributed/published in all locations specified in [Section 6.1.4](#) for at least one week (allowing time for relying parties to update their installations of CA certificates).

Any modifications to this policy will be published at least two weeks prior to their taking effect.

2.4 Access controls on repositories

Read access to repositories via HTTP is unrestricted. Repositories are publicly available for read access.

Write access to repositories is restricted to CA operators.

The CILogon Policy Management Authority grants the International Grid Trust Federation and its PMAs the right of unlimited redistribution of this information.

3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

3.1 Naming

3.1.1 Types of names

The subject and issuer names are X.500 distinguished names. All relative distinguished name components are encoded as PrintableString and are compliant with [RFC 4630](#) and [GFD.125](#).

The issuer name for all certificates is:

```
/DC=org/DC=cilogon/C=US/O=CILogon/CN=CILogon Silver CA 1
```

The CA updates the issuer CN in case of key changeover ([Section 5.6](#)), so that each "CILogon Silver CA #" for a given numeric "#" value unambiguously corresponds to a unique CA keypair and self-signed CA certificate. Updates to the issuer name constitute a change to this document ([Section 9.12](#)).

The subject name template for all certificates is:

```
/DC=org/DC=cilogon/C=US/O=OrganizationDisplayName/CN=EndEntityName UID
```

In the above template:

- *OrganizationDisplayName* is the value of the OrganizationDisplayName element in the EntityDescriptor for the identity provider found in the [SAML metadata for the InCommon Federation](#).

- EndEntityName is a presentation of the subject's actual name. It is formed in one of two ways:
 - If GivenName and Surname values are provided in the SAML authentication assertion, then EndEntityName is the concatenation of the two values (i.e., "Givenname Surname").
 - GivenName is the value of the [RFC 4519](#) inetOrgPerson givenName attribute in the SAML authentication assertion.
 - Surname is the value of the [RFC 4519](#) inetOrgPerson 'sn' (surname) attribute in the SAML authentication assertion.
 - Otherwise, if a displayName value is provided in the [RFC 2798](#) inetOrgPerson DisplayName attribute in the SAML authentication assertion, then EndEntityName is the displayName value.
- *UID* is a unique alphanumeric identifier for the subscriber, assigned by the CA, to ensure uniqueness of subject names (see [Section 3.1.5](#)).

For example:

```
/DC=org/DC=cilogon/C=US/O=University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign/CN=Jim Basney
A47983
```

The subject alternative name (subjectAltName) extension contains an Internet mail address of type rfc822Name (for example: jbasney@cilogon.org) from the [RFC 4525](#) inetOrgPerson mail attribute in the SAML authentication assertion.

3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful

The commonName (CN) component contains the subscriber's name, as vetted, authenticated, and asserted by the identity provider. The subject alternative name contains the subscriber's contact email address as registered with and asserted by the identity provider.

3.1.3 Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers

The CA does not support anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers.

3.1.4 Rules for interpreting various name forms

Subject and issuer names are X.500 distinguished names and should be interpreted according to [RFC 4514](#), [RFC 4630](#), and [GFD.125](#). Internet mail addresses in subject alternative names are rfc822Names and should be interpreted according to [RFC 2822](#).

3.1.5 Uniqueness of names

Any single subject distinguished name in a certificate must be linked with one and only one entity for the lifetime of the CA.

The eduPersonTargetedID (ePTID) or eduPersonPrincipalName (ePPN) attribute (defined in the [eduPerson specification](#)) in the SAML authentication assertion uniquely and persistently identifies the subscriber within the namespace of the identity provider (i.e., the Issuer of the SAML authentication assertion) and the service provider (i.e., the CA). The CA assigns a unique numeric identifier (UID) to each subscriber according to the ePTID/ePPN and Issuer values from the SAML assertion. Thus, while multiple subscribers from a given organization may have the same DisplayName (for example, "John Wilson"), they will have different

ePTID/ePPN values in their SAML authentication assertions, which the CA will use to assign different UIDs to them, so their certificate subjects are unique.

3.1.6 Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

No stipulation.

3.2 Initial identity validation

3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key

In the case the subscriber presents a public key for certification, the CA requires a certificate request that is digitally signed by the private key associated with the public key in the request. This requirement does not apply in the case the CA generates a keypair on the subscriber's behalf.

3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity

Membership in the [InCommon Federation](#) is open to two-year and four-year degree-granting academic institutions that are accredited by a U.S. Department of Education Regional Accrediting Agency, along with the sponsored partners of those institutions. InCommon Federation policies and operational practices authenticate organizational identity and register organizational administrators with the federation.

The [InCommon Federation](#) publishes digitally signed [SAML metadata](#) that identifies member organizations and their identity providers. The metadata provides the public key for each identity provider. The CA validates the digital signature on each SAML authentication assertion against the corresponding public key for the identity provider found in the SAML metadata. The CA rejects (and logs) assertions which are not properly signed.

An identity provider operated by an InCommon participant which has been certified via the [InCommon Identity Assurance Framework](#) includes an eduPersonAssurance attribute with the value <http://incommonfederation.org/assurance/silver> in the SAML authentication assertion to indicate that the assertion has been issued under the conditions of the Silver profile. Identity providers which have not been certified must not include these values in assertions they send. The CA rejects (and logs) assertions which do not contain this eduPersonAssurance attribute value.

3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity

InCommon Silver registration authorities vet applicant identities according to one or more of the following three methods:

- **In Person Proofing:** The applicant must appear in person to the registration authority and present a government-issued photo identification document for verification.
- **Remote Proofing:** First, the registration authority must verify the applicant's name, date of birth, and address with a government agency, institution, credit bureau, or similar. Second, the registration authority must verify the applicant's contact information, by requiring the applicant to acknowledge a notice sent to an address of record or by issuing credentials in a manner that confirms the applicant's ability to receive communications at an address of record.
- **Existing Relationship:** The registration authority may rely on the results of prior

identity proofing comparable to In Person or Remote for an applicant with a pre-existing relationship (i.e., employee or student) in good standing with the organization.

InCommon Silver registration authorities operate an identity provider service which authenticates applicants. The identity provider service must be kept up-to-date with respect to software patches, must protect the confidentiality and integrity of network communications, and must use network intrusion detection. Physical access to identity provider systems must be restricted to authorized personnel.

For a more detailed specification of the requirements on InCommon Silver identity providers, see the InCommon Silver Identity Assurance Profile published at <http://www.incommonfederation.org/assurance>.

The CA is informed of changes of applicant identity that may affect the status of the certificate as follows:

- According to the operational certificate life-cycle ([Section 4](#)), the CA requires applicants to present a fresh SAML authentication assertion for each certificate issuance. If any identifying information for the applicant has changed since the last certificate application (name, email address, organization), the CA will assign a new unique alphanumeric identifier to the subscriber, thereby creating a new subject name for the subscriber. In this way, the regular operational certificate life-cycle, whereby certificates expire and applicants request new certificates, serves to ensure that changes of applicant identity at the identity provider propagate to updated certificates.
- According to [Section 4.5.1](#) and [Section 4.9](#), subscribers and other participants are obligated to request revocation in case the information in a certificate is believed to be or has become inaccurate.

3.2.4 Non-verified subscriber information

The CA does not collect any non-verified subscriber information.

3.2.5 Validation of authority

The possession of a SAML authentication assertion, containing the required eduPersonAssurance attribute with value <http://incommonfederation.org/assurance/silver>, issued by an InCommon Federation member identity provider which is currently certified by InCommon under the Silver Identity Assurance Profile (with valid certification status published at <http://incommonfederation.org/assurance/silver>), entitles subscribers to request and receive certificates from the CA.

The CA reserves the right to reject SAML assertions that do not meet its requirements. As an InCommon service provider, the CA participates in the InCommon Identity Assurance program and may independently determine whether an identity provider, which is certified by InCommon under the Silver Profile, fully satisfies the CA's requirements (including those specified by the [International Grid Trust Federation](#)). The CA may independently reject assertions from a particular identity provider, even if that identity provider is certified by InCommon.

3.2.6 Criteria for interoperation

The CA interoperates with other members of the [International Grid Trust Federation](#) (IGTF) according to standards such as [RFC 5280](#) and [GFD.125](#).

3.3 Identification and authentication for re-key requests

3.3.1 Identification and authentication for routine re-key

Certificate re-key is not supported. Instead, subscribers should submit a new certificate application, which will be authenticated according to [Section 3.2](#).

3.3.2 Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

Certificate re-key is not supported. Instead, subscribers should submit a new certificate application, which will be authenticated according to [Section 3.2](#).

3.4 Identification and authentication for revocation request

Revocation requests from subscribers must be authenticated by one of the following methods:

- The digital signature on the request matches the certificate to be revoked.
- The subscriber submitted the revocation request in a TLS or SAML authenticated web session, and the authenticated TLS/SAML identity matches the certificate to be revoked.

Revocation requests from registration authorities must be authenticated by the following method:

- CA operators confirm the request by calling the contact phone number registered with the InCommon Federation for the requesting registration authority (i.e., InCommon identity provider).

In any case, proof of compromise or exposure of a private key is sufficient justification for CA operators to revoke the corresponding certificate.

4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

4.1 Certificate Application

4.1.1 Who can submit a certificate application

Any person identified by a SAML authentication assertion, conforming to the InCommon Silver Identity Assurance Profile, issued by an InCommon Federation member which is currently certified by InCommon under the Silver Identity Assurance Profile, may submit a certificate application. Certificate applications must be submitted by the certificate subject (i.e., the person identified in the certificate) or a software process acting on the subject's behalf (i.e., initiated by the subject).

4.1.2 Enrollment process and responsibilities

Subscribers obtain a certificate from the CA according to either of the following two enrollment process options, which differ with respect to keypair generation. All network communication

occurs over encrypted HTTPS connections, with server identity verification, according to to [RFC 2818](#).

In the first option, the subscriber generates the key pair. First, the subscriber (i.e., software running on the subscriber's behalf) opens a connection to the CA web service. The CA web service then authenticates the subscriber according to the OASIS standard SAML Web Browser Single Sign On (SSO) protocols, i.e., the CA web service redirects the subscriber's web browser to his or her institution's identity provider, where the subscriber authenticates, and then the identity provider redirects the subscriber's web browser back to the CA web service, delivering a signed, time-limited SAML authentication assertion issued by the identity provider to the CA web service. Next, the subscriber (i.e., software running on the subscriber's behalf) generates a 2048 bit RSA key pair and submits a certificate request containing the 2048 bit RSA public key to the CA web service. Finally, if the CA approves the request (according to [Section 4.2.2](#)), the CA web service returns a signed X.509 certificate containing the public key and subject distinguished name to the subscriber. Otherwise, if the CA rejects the request (i.e., any of the conditions in [Section 4.2.2](#) are unmet), the CA web service will not return a signed certificate but will instead return an error message to the subscriber.

In the second option, the CA generates the key pair and delivers it securely to the subscriber. First, the subscriber opens a connection to the CA web service and authenticates via SAML Web Browser SSO as above. Next, the CA web service prompts the subscriber to enter a private key pass phrase of at least 12 characters in length. Then, if the CA approves the request (according to [Section 4.2.2](#)), the CA web service generates a 2048 bit RSA key pair and a signed X.509 certificate containing the public key and subject distinguished name for the subscriber, bundles them in a PKCS12 object that is encrypted with the subscriber-chosen pass phrase, and delivers the PKCS12 object to the subscriber. The CA web service securely destroys all its copies of PKCS12 objects within 15 minutes of their creation. If instead the CA rejects the request (i.e., any of the conditions in [Section 4.2.2](#) are unmet), the CA web service will not generate a key pair or certificate but will instead return an error message to the subscriber.

4.2 Certificate application processing

4.2.1 Performing identification and authentication functions

The CA web service validates the signed SAML authentication assertion, consulting InCommon Federation metadata.

4.2.2 Approval or rejection of certificate applications

The CA approves certificate applications if all of the following criteria are met:

- The subscriber submits the certificate application in a SAML authenticated and TLS secured web session.
- The digital signature on the SAML assertion is valid and corresponds to the identity provider's public key in the InCommon Federation metadata.
- The identity provider is currently certified by InCommon under the Silver Identity Assurance Profile (with valid certification status published at <http://incommonfederation.org/assurance/silver>) and the CA determines that the identity provider meets the requirements of this policy (and thus IGTF requirements).
- The SAML assertion contains the required eduPersonAssurance attribute with value <http://incommonfederation.org/assurance/silver>.

- The SAML assertion contains the attributes required for constructing the certificate subject (see [Section 3.1.1](#)).
- In case the subscriber provides a certificate request, it must be digitally signed by the private key associated with the 2048 bit RSA public key in the request (see [Section 3.2.1](#)).

Otherwise, the certificate application will be rejected.

4.2.3 Time to process certificate applications

Certificate applications are processed automatically. Approved applications result in automatic (i.e., immediate) certificate issuance. Non-approved applications are automatically rejected. All certificate applications (approved and non-approved) are logged.

4.3 Certificate issuance

4.3.1 CA actions during certificate issuance

Upon approval of a certificate application, the CA assigns an X.500 distinguished name to the subscriber based on the identifying information in the authentication assertion (see [Section 3.1](#)) and issues a signed X.509 certificate containing the subscriber's public key and subject distinguished name.

4.3.2 Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate

The CA delivers the issued certificate to the subscriber through the software process the subscriber used to apply for the certificate.

The CA notifies the subscriber of certificate issuance by email to the mail address in the SAML authentication assertion.

4.4 Certificate acceptance

4.4.1 Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

Certificate acceptance by the applicant is assumed. To reject an issued certificate, the subscriber should submit a revocation request according to [Section 4.9](#).

4.4.2 Publication of the certificate by the CA

The CA does not publish end entity certificates.

4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

The CA does not notify any other entities of certificate issuance.

4.5 Key pair and certificate usage

4.5.1 Subscriber private key and certificate usage

Subscribers must protect their private keys according to the [IGTF Guidelines on Private Key](#)

[Protection.](#)

Subscribers must request revocation as soon as possible (within one business day) if (1) the private key corresponding to the certificate is (suspected or known to be) lost or compromised or (2) if the data in the certificate is no longer valid. (See [Section 4.9.](#))

The CA informs subscribers of these responsibilities on a web page they view when requesting certificates.

4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate usage

Relying parties should rely on certificates consistent with applicable certificate content (e.g., key usage field), successfully perform public key operations as a condition of relying on a certificate, assume responsibility to check the status of a certificate (see [Section 4.9](#)), and not presume any authorization of a certificate subject based solely on possession of a certificate or its corresponding private key.

4.6 Certificate renewal

Certificate renewal is not supported. Subscribers must generate a new key pair for every certificate request.

4.6.1 Circumstance for certificate renewal

Not applicable.

4.6.2 Who may request renewal

Not applicable.

4.6.3 Processing certificate renewal requests

Not applicable.

4.6.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

Not applicable.

4.6.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate

Not applicable.

4.6.6 Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA

Not applicable.

4.6.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

Not applicable.

4.7 Certificate re-key

Certificate re-key is not supported. Instead, subscribers should submit a new certificate application according to Section 4.1.

4.7.1 Circumstance for certificate re-key

Not applicable.

4.7.2 Who may request certification of a new public key

Not applicable.

4.7.3 Processing certificate re-keying requests

Not applicable.

4.7.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

Not applicable.

4.7.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate

Not applicable.

4.7.6 Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA

Not applicable.

4.7.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

Not applicable.

4.8 Certificate modification

Certificate modification is not supported. Instead, subscribers should submit a new certificate application according to Section 4.1.

4.8.1 Circumstance for certificate modification

Not applicable.

4.8.2 Who may request certificate modification

Not applicable.

4.8.3 Processing certificate modification requests

Not applicable.

4.8.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber

Not applicable.

4.8.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate

Not applicable.

4.8.6 Publication of the modified certificate by the CA

Not applicable.

4.8.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities

Not applicable.

4.9 Certificate revocation and suspension

4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation

The CA will revoke certificates in any of the following circumstances:

- The private key is suspected or reported to be lost or compromised.
- The initial identity validation for obtaining the certificate is determined to not comply with [Section 3.2](#).
- The information in the certificate is believed to be or has become inaccurate.
- The certificate is reported to no longer be needed.

4.9.2 Who can request revocation

Any participants can request revocation. Revocation requests will be authenticated according to [Section 3.4](#).

4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request

Revocation requests may be submitted by email to ca@cilogon.org.

4.9.4 Revocation request grace period

Revocation requests should be submitted within one business day of the occurrence of any of the circumstances for revocation in [Section 4.9.1](#).

4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request

The CA must process revocation requests within one working day of the request being received.

4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

Relying parties should consult the CRL in order to check the status of certificates on which they wish to rely.

4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency (if applicable)

A new CRL is issued daily and also when a certificate is revoked.

4.9.8 Maximum latency for CRLs (if applicable)

The maximum latency between the generation of CRLs and posting of the CRLs to the repository is one hour.

4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability

Aside from the published CRL, no on-line revocation/status checking is provided.

4.9.10 On-line revocation checking requirements

No stipulation.

4.9.11 Other forms of revocation advertisements available

No stipulation.

4.9.12 Special requirements re key compromise

No stipulation.

4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension

Suspension of certificates is not supported.

4.9.14 Who can request suspension

Not applicable.

4.9.15 Procedure for suspension request

Not applicable.

4.9.16 Limits on suspension period

Not applicable.

4.10 Certificate status services

4.10.1 Operational characteristics

The CA publishes the current CRL in DER format at <http://crl.cilogon.org/cilogon-silver.crl> with Content-Type: application/pkix-crl according to [RFC 5280](#).

4.10.2 Service availability

The CA will endeavor to provide uninterrupted availability of the CRL service. Any significant

availability disruptions will be announced by email to igt-general@gridpma.org and on the CA web site (<http://ca.cilogon.org/>).

4.10.3 Optional features

No stipulation.

4.11 End of subscription

A subscriber may end subscription to the CA services by requesting revocation ([Section 4.9](#)) of all certificates issued to the subscriber or by allowing all certificates issued to the subscriber to expire without requesting any new certificates.

4.12 Key escrow and recovery

4.12.1 Key escrow and recovery policy and practices

The CA does not support private key escrow and recovery.

4.12.2 Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices

The CA does not support session key encapsulation and recovery.

5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS

5.1 Physical controls

5.1.1 Site location and construction

CA equipment is located in NCSA's machine room in the National Petascale Computing Facility (NPCF) on the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign campus at 1725 South Oak Street in Champaign, Illinois (USA).

CA equipment is also located in Oak Ridge National Lab (ORNL) Building 5100, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6173.

5.1.2 Physical access

CA equipment at NCSA is located in a locked rack inside the NCSA machine room. The machine room is locked at all times, requires keycard authentication for access, and is monitored by video camera. Only University of Illinois staff, approved by NCSA, are authorized to enter the machine room. The key to the rack is kept in the NCSA key safe, access to which is logged.

CA equipment at ORNL is located in a restricted, badge-access machine room, while ORNL campus requires a valid badge or visitor pass to be on-site. The machine room is locked at all times, requires keycard authentication for access and has 24x7 security monitoring for intrusion.

5.1.3 Power and air conditioning

No stipulation.

5.1.4 Water exposures

No stipulation.

5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection

No stipulation.

5.1.6 Media storage

No stipulation.

5.1.7 Waste disposal

No stipulation.

5.1.8 Off-site backup

CA system backups are archived weekly to a secondary storage facility in the NCSA Building on the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign campus at 1205 West Clark Street in Urbana, Illinois. The NCSA Building is approximately 3 miles away from NPCF, where the CA is located.

5.2 Procedural controls

5.2.1 Trusted roles

CA operators are responsible for the administration of all CA systems.

5.2.2 Number of persons required per task

No stipulation.

5.2.3 Identification and authentication for each role

CA operators authenticate by individual password or private key. When any person leaves the role of CA operator, his or her access to CA systems will be immediately revoked (i.e., system accounts removed or disabled).

5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties

No stipulation.

5.3 Personnel controls

5.3.1 Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

All CA operators are full-time University of Illinois employees.

5.3.2 Background check procedures

No stipulation.

5.3.3 Training requirements

All CA operators are required to read and abide by all CA policy and operational documentation ([Section 5.3.8](#)). Current CA operators will train and mentor new CA operators.

5.3.4 Retraining frequency and requirements

All CA operators are required to review all CA policy and operational documents at least once per year.

5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and sequence

No stipulation.

5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorized actions

No stipulation.

5.3.7 Independent contractor requirements

No stipulation.

5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel

The CA supplies policy and operational documentation to personnel at <http://docs.cilogon.org>.

5.4 Audit logging procedures

5.4.1 Types of events recorded

The CA logs and archives the following items:

- Certificate requests
- Certificate issuance
- Certificate revocations
- Issued CRLs
- Attempted and successful accesses to CA systems and reboots of those systems

5.4.2 Frequency of processing log

The CA archives audit logs according to [Section 5.1.8](#).

5.4.3 Retention period for audit log

The CA maintains audit logs for at least three years.

5.4.4 Protection of audit log

Only CA operators can view audit logs.

5.4.5 Audit log backup procedures

The CA archives audit logs according to [Section 5.1.8](#).

5.4.6 Audit collection system (internal vs. external)

The audit collection system is internal to the CA.

5.4.7 Notification to event-causing subject

The subject who caused an audit event to occur is not notified of the specific audit action.

5.4.8 Vulnerability assessments

No stipulation.

5.5 Records archival

5.5.1 Types of records archived

InCommon Silver registration authorities must record registration data, including identity proofing document types and issuers, full name, date of birth, and current address of record.

The CA archives all audit data (see [Section 5.1.8](#) and [Section 5.4](#)).

5.5.2 Retention period for archive

InCommon Silver registration authorities must retain registration data for 180 days beyond the expiration of the applicant's institutional credential.

The CA maintains archives for at least three years.

5.5.3 Protection of archive

No stipulation.

5.5.4 Archive backup procedures

See [Section 5.1.8](#).

5.5.5 Requirements for time-stamping of records

No stipulation.

5.5.6 Archive collection system (internal or external)

No stipulation.

5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information

No stipulation.

5.6 Key changeover

The maximum lifetime of the CA's public key is 20 years. The CA must not sign certificates with validity dates beyond the CA public key's maximum lifetime. Instead, the CA must re-key or cease operation ([Section 5.8](#)) in advance of reaching the maximum lifetime of the public key. The CA will also re-key in cases where the security of the current key is weakened, due to security incident, significant change in personnel, policy, or operations, or changes in recommended key length or algorithm.

The key changeover procedure is as follows. The CA generates a new key pair and delivers it to relying parties according to [Section 6.1](#). The CA delivers the new key pair in a new self-signed CA certificate, with a new issuer name ([Section 3.1.1](#)). The CA amends this document according to [Section 9.12](#), with the new issuer name and Policy OID, along with any other policy and/or procedure changes for the new key pair. In an emergency, the CA may begin operation under the new CA key pair immediately, but in non-emergency cases, the CA should perform the changeover in an orderly manner, providing sufficient time for relying parties to obtain and install the new self-signed CA certificate.

The procedures to provide a new public key to the CA's users following a re-key by the CA are the same as the procedure for providing the current key ([Section 2.1](#)). The new public key is not certified in a certificate signed using the old key (i.e., the CA signs only end entity certificates and not CA certificates).

5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery

5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures

CA operators will coordinate incident response and compromise handling with:

- University of Illinois incident response teams ([CITES](#) and [NCSA](#))
- InCommon Federation incident response teams
- International Grid Trust Federation (IGTF) incident response teams (i.e., the [IGTF Risk Assessment Team](#))
- Cyberinfrastructure project incident response teams

In the event of a significant security incident, the CA will re-key ([Section 5.6](#)).

5.7.2 Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted

If computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted or suspected to be corrupted, CA operators will re-establish a secure environment with the assistance of University of Illinois incident response teams.

5.7.3 Entity private key compromise procedures

In the event of a CA private key compromise, the CA will revoke all certificates signed by that

key, re-establish a secure environment, re-key ([Section 5.6](#)), and advise subscribers to re-apply ([Section 4.1](#)), in coordination with relying parties and incident response teams.

5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster

Business continuity plans and capabilities are under development.

5.8 CA or RA termination

In the event that it is necessary for the CA to cease operation, the CA will develop a termination plan in consultation with participants that minimizes disruption to the extent possible. Archival CA records will be maintained by the University of Illinois in accordance with the stated retention period ([Section 5.5.2](#)).

InCommon identity providers (which act as registration authorities according to [Section 1.3.2](#)) must notify InCommon of any material changes in operation that may affect qualification under the Silver assurance profile. InCommon notifies all service providers (including the CILogon Silver CA) of changes in identity provider certification via updates to SAML metadata, which the CA will refresh at least once per day.

6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS

6.1 Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1 Key pair generation

End entity private keys may be generated by subscribers or by the CA, according to [Section 4.1.2](#). In either case, private keys must be generated and protected according to the [IGTF Guidelines on Private Key Protection](#).

CA operators generate CA private keys using trustworthy cryptographic software, on an offline computer dedicated for this purpose, using a fresh operating system installation from known good media. After generating a new key pair, the CA operator imports it into the cryptographic modules ([Section 6.2.6](#)) and writes an encrypted backup to offline media ([Section 6.2.4](#)). A member of the CILogon PMA supervises the CA private key generation process and records for audit purposes the time/date, location, personnel involved, computer, software, and operating system used, and details about the key pair created and cryptographic modules.

6.1.2 Private key delivery to subscriber

In the case when the CA, rather than the subscriber, generates the private key, according to [Section 4.1.2](#), the CA delivers the private key to the subscriber in a PKCS12 object that is encrypted with a subscriber-chosen pass phrase and sent to the subscriber over an encrypted HTTPS session.

6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer

In the case where the subscriber generates the public key to be certified, the subscriber delivers his or her public key, in a certificate request signed by the corresponding private key, to the CA, in a SAML authenticated TLS encrypted session according to the certificate

application process ([Section 4.1](#)).

6.1.4 CA public key delivery to relying parties

The root CA certificate is provided to the [International Grid Trust Federation](#) (IGTF) for inclusion in the IGTF Trust Anchor Distribution. It is also published in the CA repository ([Section 2.2](#)).

6.1.5 Key sizes

CA and end entity keys use a 2048 bit RSA modulus.

6.1.6 Public key parameters generation and quality checking

No stipulation.

6.1.7 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

Certificate extensions, including key usage flags, are specified in [Section 7.1.2](#).

6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards and controls

The CA stores private keys in cryptographic hardware security modules certified at FIPS 140-2 level 3 and operated in FIPS 140 level 3 mode.

6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

The CA private key is not under n out of m multi-person control.

6.2.3 Private key escrow

The CA private key is not escrowed.

6.2.4 Private key backup

The CA private key is stored in multiple cryptographic hardware security modules for redundancy.

The CA private key is backed up in encrypted form on offline media stored in a locked safe in the University of Illinois office of the CILogon PMA chair. The pass phrase of the encrypted private key is stored in a sealed envelope stored in a locked cabinet in the University of Illinois office of a separate CILogon PMA member.

6.2.5 Private key archival

The CA private key is not archived.

6.2.6 Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

CA operators transfer encrypted CA private keys from offline media into the cryptographic hardware security modules at the time of key pair generation ([Section 6.1.1](#)) or in the case that a new cryptographic hardware security module is added to the CA system. Private keys are never transferred from a cryptographic module.

6.2.7 Private key storage on cryptographic module

The CA stores its private keys on cryptographic modules in non-exportable form.

6.2.8 Method of activating private key

The CA system activates private keys in the cryptographic modules automatically on power on. Keys are activated for an indefinite period.

6.2.9 Method of deactivating private key

CA operators can deactivate the private key by powering off the cryptographic module or using the operator interface to mark the key inactive.

6.2.10 Method of destroying private key

CA operators can destroy the private key in the cryptographic module by reinitializing the device (i.e., restoring it to factory default settings).

6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating

The cryptographic hardware security modules meet FIPS 140-2 level 3.

6.3 Other aspects of key pair management

6.3.1 Public key archival

All issued certificates (which contain public keys) are archived for at least three years.

6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

End entity certificates have a maximum lifetime of 13 months.

CA certificates have a maximum lifetime of 20 years.

6.4 Activation data

6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation

CA operators use cryptographic module software and procedures to generate and install activation data on CA servers that allows the CA servers to submit certificate requests to the cryptographic modules for signing.

6.4.2 Activation data protection

Cryptographic module activation data resides on the local CA server filesystem, protected by operating system permissions.

6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data

No stipulation.

6.5 Computer security controls

6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements

The CA system consists of front-end web application servers, back-end CA signing servers, and cryptographic hardware security modules. The front-end web application servers accept HTTP (port 80) and HTTPS (port 443) connections from the Internet, serving CRLs over HTTP and certificate requests over HTTPS (with SAML authentication). The front-end web application servers connect to the back-end CA signing servers via private links. The back-end CA signing servers process approved signing requests and log all certificate issuances. The back-end CA signing servers connect to cryptographic hardware security modules via TLS, authenticated using the activation data described in [Section 6.4](#). All CA systems are dedicated machines, running no other services than those needed for CA operations. The CA systems are located on a highly protected/monitored network and are actively monitored for intrusions.

6.5.2 Computer security rating

No stipulation.

6.6 Life cycle technical controls

6.6.1 System development controls

No stipulation.

6.6.2 Security management controls

No stipulation.

6.6.3 Life cycle security controls

No stipulation.

6.7 Network security controls

All CA systems employ operating system firewalls allowing inbound connections only for required CA services. CA systems are connected to highly protected networks which are actively monitored for intrusions.

6.8 Time-stamping

CA servers maintain accurate system clocks via trusted NTP servers.

7. CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES

7.1 Certificate profile

End entity certificates comply with [RFC 5280](#) and [GFD.125](#).

7.1.1 Version number(s)

The X.509 certificate version number is 2 indicating a Version 3 certificate.

7.1.2 Certificate extensions

The self-signed CA certificate contains the following extensions:

- X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
- X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
- X509v3 Subject Key Identifier
- X509v3 Authority Key Identifier
- X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
email:ca@cilogon.org

End entity certificates contain the following extensions:

- X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
- X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment
- X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
TLS Web Client Authentication
- X509v3 Certificate Policies:
Policy: 1.3.6.1.4.1.34998.1.1.11
Policy: 1.2.840.113612.5.2.2.5
- X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
URI:<http://crl.cilogon.org/cilogon-silver.crl>
- X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
email:username@example.org

7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers

Hash Functions: sha1 1.3.14.3.2.26, sha256 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1, sha384 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2, sha512 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3
RSA Encryption: rsaEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1
Signature Algorithms: sha1WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5, sha256WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11, sha384WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12, sha512WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.13

7.1.4 Name forms

See [Section 3.1.1](#).

7.1.5 Name constraints

All distinguished names have the following prefix: /DC=org/DC=cilogon/C=US

7.1.6 Certificate policy object identifier

End entity certificates contain the following policy OIDs:

1.3.6.1.4.1.34998.1.1.11	CILogon Silver CA CP/CPS (this document)
1.2.840.113612.5.2.2.5	Member Integrated X.509 Credential Services (MICS)

7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints extension

Not used.

7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics

Not used.

7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension

No stipulation.

7.2 CRL profile

CRLs comply with [RFC 5280](#).

7.2.1 Version number(s)

The CRL version number is 1 indicating a Version 2 CRL.

7.2.2 CRL and CRL entry extensions

CRLs contain the following extension: X509v3 CRL Number

7.3 OCSP profile

The CA does not support OCSP.

7.3.1 Version number(s)

Not applicable.

7.3.2 OCSP extensions

Not applicable.

8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS

8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment

InCommon Silver identity providers are audited by an independent internal or external auditor for compliance with the Silver identity assurance profile. The CA relies on the InCommon Federation to ensure that identity providers (which act as registration authorities for the CA) are properly audited.

The CA performs internal operational audits at least once per year to verify compliance with the rules and procedures specified in this document.

A list of CA operators is maintained and verified at least once per year.

8.2 Identity/qualifications of assessor

No stipulation.

8.3 Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

No stipulation.

8.4 Topics covered by assessment

No stipulation.

8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency

No stipulation.

8.6 Communication of results

The final audit reports for InCommon Silver identity providers (or a letter summarizing the final assessment results) are conveyed to InCommon.

CA audit results are made available to the CILogon PMA and TAGPMA upon request.

9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS

9.1 Fees

9.1.1 Certificate issuance or renewal fees

The CA does not charge certificate issuance or renewal fees.

9.1.2 Certificate access fees

The CA does not charge certificate access fees.

9.1.3 Revocation or status information access fees

The CA does not charge revocation or status information access fees.

9.1.4 Fees for other services

The CA does not charge fees for other services.

9.1.5 Refund policy

The CA does not give refunds.

9.2 Financial responsibility

The CA accepts no financial responsibility.

9.2.1 Insurance coverage

No stipulation.

9.2.2 Other assets

No stipulation.

9.2.3 Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

No stipulation.

9.3 Confidentiality of business information

9.3.1 Scope of confidential information

No stipulation.

9.3.2 Information not within the scope of confidential information

No stipulation.

9.3.3 Responsibility to protect confidential information

No stipulation.

9.4 Privacy of personal information

Information and data maintained in electronic media on University of Illinois computer systems are protected by the same laws and policies, and are subject to the same limitations, as information and communications in other media. Before storing or sending confidential or personal information, subscribers should understand that most materials on University systems are, by definition, public records. As such, they are subject to laws and policies that

may compel the University to disclose them. The privacy of materials kept in electronic data storage and electronic mail is neither a right nor is it guaranteed.

9.4.1 Privacy plan

No stipulation.

9.4.2 Information treated as private

No stipulation.

9.4.3 Information not deemed private

The contents of certificates and CRLs are not deemed private.

9.4.4 Responsibility to protect private information

No stipulation.

9.4.5 Notice and consent to use private information

No stipulation.

9.4.6 Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process

No stipulation.

9.4.7 Other information disclosure circumstances

No stipulation.

9.5 Intellectual property rights

No stipulation.

9.6 Representations and warranties

9.6.1 CA representations and warranties

No stipulation.

9.6.2 RA representations and warranties

No stipulation.

9.6.3 Subscriber representations and warranties

No stipulation.

9.6.4 Relying party representations and warranties

No stipulation.

9.6.5 Representations and warranties of other participants

No stipulation.

9.7 Disclaimers of warranties

No stipulation.

9.8 Limitations of liability

No stipulation.

9.9 Indemnities

No stipulation.

9.10 Term and termination

9.10.1 Term

This policy is in effect during the validity period of certificates issued under it.

9.10.2 Termination

No stipulation.

9.10.3 Effect of termination and survival

No stipulation.

9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants

No stipulation.

9.12 Amendments

9.12.1 Procedure for amendment

The procedure for amending this document is as follows:

- Increment the document version number and date in title page and [Section 1.2](#).
- Increment the Policy OID version number in title page, [Section 1.2](#), [Section 7.1.2](#), and [Section 7.1.6](#).
- Make changes to the document text.
- Document changes in the revision history in [Section 1.2](#).
- Announce the policy changes to pma@cilogon.org.
- Publish the updated document at <http://ca.cilogon.org/cilogon-silver-policy.pdf> and

<http://ca.cilogon.org/policy>.

- Publish a PDF highlighting changes from the last version at <http://ca.cilogon.org/policy>.
- Announce the policy changes to tagpma-general@tagpma.org and <http://ca.cilogon.org/news>.
- Allow a two week comment period. Incorporate comments and update the document as necessary.
- Update the CA configuration to include the new Policy OID in issued certificates.

9.12.2 Notification mechanism and period

Any modifications to this policy must be published/announced at least two weeks prior to their taking effect.

9.12.3 Circumstances under which OID must be changed

The version number in the Certificate Policy OID must be incremented upon any significant change in policy.

9.13 Dispute resolution provisions

No stipulation.

9.14 Governing law

The laws of the United States of America and the State of Illinois, where this CA is established, govern the interpretation of this policy.

9.15 Compliance with applicable law

No stipulation.

9.16 Miscellaneous provisions

9.16.1 Entire agreement

No stipulation.

9.16.2 Assignment

No stipulation.

9.16.3 Severability

No stipulation.

9.16.4 Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

No stipulation.

9.16.5 Force Majeure

No stipulation.

9.17 Other provisions

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